All Together Now
An essay on game theory, the Catalan coup attempt and contemporary Spanish politics
Interior view of a 1974 AMC Matador X coupe, with a quick-release design for the steering wheel. The photographer, Christopher Ziemnowicz, releases all rights but a photo credit would be appreciated if this image is used anywhere other than Wikipedia (30 June 2006)
You’ve probably seen the game of chicken in American films: two vehicles race towards each other and the first one to swerve loses. It was a major theme in Rebel Without a Cause and Footloose, for example. Game theorists have studied challenges based on brinksmanship extensively. Their conclusion is that the way to win is to show pre-commitment. If you ostentatiously remove your vehicle’s steering wheel and throw it out of the window, non-suicidal players will have no option other than to swerve. Irrational players have an advantage.
Perhaps surprisingly, this insight from game theory seems to have been the main inspiration behind the strategy of the Catalan independence movement, with far-reaching consequences up to now. We have discussed Artur Mas’s pivot to populism before, but here’s a brief recap for people outside Spain. Mas was the handpicked successor to Jordi Pujol, the First Minister of Catalonia between 1980 and 2003. Although Pujol and Mas’ party, Convergence & Union (CiU), won the regional elections in 2003 and 2006, it did so without a majority; and other parties ganged up on it to deliver a Socialist-led coalition in Catalonia, which is one of Spain’s 17 autonomous communities.
Mas’s CiU finally got close enough to a majority in 2010 and 2012 that he was able to govern, but it was a poisoned chalice. The Catalan economy was deep in a depression, along with the rest of Spain and much of Southern Europe as a whole. People were angry at corruption at a time that news was breaking about a series of kickback scandals involving CiU; and populism was in the air. Mas decided to add a dose of populist secessionism into CiU’s traditional mix of business-friendly Christian democracy and Catalan nationalism, combined with opportunistic dealmaking with major national parties in Madrid whenever it could. The new mix came onto the agenda about September 2012, just before the election in November of the same year, and the newest element, populist secessionism, gradually came to dominate the others in the years that followed.
Mas organised an unofficial and illegal independence referendum in 2014. The vote showed that a minority of the Catalan population (but probably a majority of the native Catalan speakers) were strongly committed to moving towards independence for the region, while the majority of the population (particularly most native Spanish speakers) just stayed at home rather than participating in a game that seemed to be played with loaded dice.
In 2015, Mas cut a deal between CiU and the pro-independence Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) to present a joint platform for independence under the banner Together for Yes (JxSí). He said the regional elections would be a de-facto referendum, although he never discussed what a win would look like. Although the new platform won, with just under 40% of the vote, its joint vote went down from 44% previously. Mas cynically declared the rather perfunctory result as a resounding triumph and began planning a game of chicken with the state.
Another pro-independence party, with its roots in the anarchist movement, called the Popular Unity Candidacy (la CUP), had won 8% in the same election. Catalonia’s electoral system, which rewards votes in the countryside where Catalan nationalism is strong, was enough to give JxSí and la CUP a majority of the seats in the regional parliament, even though they had together fallen short of 50%. To its credit, la CUP said that the result wasn’t good enough to declare independence; and refused to vote for Mas as First Minister of the region in protest at his enthusiasm for austerity.
Mas obviously decided to ostentatiously throw the steering wheel out of the window in order to keep la CUP on board and win his game of chicken with the state. He found a long-time CiU mayor without a university degree, who was fanatically pro-independence, and cut a deal with la CUP to make him First Minister with a mandate to run a third referendum without swerving. His name was Carles Puigdemont. Surely the state would have to chicken out of a conflict if it saw the Catalan-nationalist side didn’t have a steering wheel?
We all know what happened next. Puigdemont made a sloppy and illegal referendum the centre-piece of a coup attempt in 2017; the national police intervened in a heavy-handed way; Barcelona-based multinationals moved their headquarters outside the region; Catalonia’s devolved powers were suspended; Puigdemont ran away to Brussels (allegedly in the boot of a car); and other leaders of the coup were arrested. Support for independence, which never reached a true majority, has been receding ever since.
Why did Mas’s gambit fail quite so badly? He clearly thought that he was playing a game of chicken with the state. Unfortunately for the secessionist side, though, the state wasn’t playing the same game at all: it was just enforcing its own rules in its own territory (see Articles 1, 2, 92 and 155 of the Spanish Constitution; and Articles 252-253, Articles 432-435, Articles 472-484 and Articles 544-549 of Spain’s Criminal Code of 2016). The state effectively acted as a brick wall rather than a player in a game of chicken. Without a steering wheel, Puigdemont’s car smashed into it.
In a sane world, this would be the end of the issue and there would be no need to rehash the sorry events of 2014-2018 in a blog about thinking critically about current affairs. Unfortunately, this isn’t a sane world at all, as we will see next.
JxSí ended up splitting, with ERC once again running by itself and CiU rebranding as Together for Catalonia (Junts per Catalunya, normally shortened to Junts). Puigdemont and his successors led the party into second place in regional elections in 2017, third place in 2021 and second place in 2024. The party left the Catalan government in 2022; and the Socialists regained power in the region last year.
Out of power, Junts should have concentrated on re-installing a steering wheel. However, its fortunes turned on 23 July 2023 without any need to go back to the drawing board. Socialist Prime Minister (PM) Pedro Sánchez limped into second place in a general election, but Alberto Núñez Feijóo of the centre-right Popular Party (PP) did worse than expected and fell short of a clear path to power.
As the vote came in, it became clear that Puigdemont’s Junts was going to be a kingmaker, with its seven seats able to deliver power to Sánchez, who had already pardoned the coup leaders who had been found guilty in 2021. He had also watered down the sedition law and rules on embezzlement in 2022 to keep ERC happy.
How can you work with a driver without a steering wheel? Sánchez, who has been becoming increasingly populist over the last couple of years, was able to throw promises at Junts, including an amnesty, an implausible new financing regime for Catalonia and transferring competence to manage immigration to the regional government. Somehow, it worked; and he was able to become Prime Minister of Spain once again in November 2023. However, he is a hostage to fortune. The Spanish press is having lots of fun with regular updates on what Puigdemont’s Junts will do next as the separatist party continues to press ahead without a steering wheel.
The right-wing Catalan separatist party is very angry at the application of the amnesty law. Spain’s independence judges have refused to applied it for embezzlement, one of the many crimes that Puigdemont is accused of breaking during his and Mas’ game of chicken with the state and afterwards (it should be obvious that regional governments do not have a mandate to use public funds to organise illegal activities that will benefit the parties that are in power). Meanwhile, the non-government organisation (NGO) that Puigdemont founded is facing accusations of corruption. The new financing regime for Catalonia looks basically impossible for Sánchez to deliver.
Feijóo’s PP is trying hard to persuade Junts to abandon Sánchez’s loose coalition of allies. It had some success recently as both parties joined forces with hard-right Spanish-nationalist party Vox to shoot down a proposed “omnibus law,” that bundled lots of unrelated issues (including plans to rebuild the parts of Valencia that were damaged by floods) into one parliamentary vote. Socialist leaders are incandescent with rage at what they see as Junts’ treachery. In fact, Junts is just doing what Junts has always done - looking out for its own interests in a fairly reckless way.
Unfortunately for Feijóo, Junts has made it clear that it would feel uncomfortable voting alongside Vox in a no-confidence vote in Sánchez. Instead, the Catalan-separatist party is demanding that Sánchez hold a confidence vote. This demand looks odd to many - the Spanish Constitution says that a PM can call a confidence vote, but doesn’t provide a mechanism for a minority party to call one.
In a development this week, Sánchez agreed to resubmit some of his proposals, with Junts’ support. The PP (the main opposition party) agreed to support the watered-down version of the new omnibus law. At the same time, the Socialists agreed to let Junts lead a parliamentary debate on a confidence vote. In practice, though, Sánchez won’t present a vote to parliament. If this solution makes your head hurt, please know that you are not alone!
Junts is now saying that it will only support a budget for 2025 if the Socialists execute their promise to let the regional government of Catalonia manage immigration (a competency that now belongs to the national government). Sánchez had prevously flagged the possibility of a budget deal in January-March 2025.
Before the latest conflict with Junts, Socialist sources have been briefing the press that the party might just roll over the 2024 budget. However, the press in Spain has gradually coming to realise that all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) need to massively increase defence spending during Donald Trump’s second administration in the US. Spain is one of Europe’s laggards when it comes to investing in defence, as discussed previously in this blog.
In parallel with his conflicts with the populists of Vox, Sánchez is doubling down on his own pivot to populism. Recent headlines involve the government leaning on the executive chairman of incumbent telecoms company Telefónica to resign so a Socialist loyalist could take the top job; proposals to do away with popular accusations in order to get the PM’s wife off the hook of a corruption scandal; and a pitch to reform legal education that has raised hackles among the government’s critics. Meanwhile, a scandal about the attorney general leaking confidential tax information about the partner of a PP politician is gradually becoming even more sordid, while other scandals continue to simmer.
Of course, 2025 is also the 50th anniversary of the death of the late Spanish dictator Francisco Franco. Sánchez has decided to make a song and dance about it, rather than celebrating the anniversary of the 1978 Constitution, which is less useful for his purposes since the next election is due by 2027. If the parties in his loose alliance have anything in common, it is the fact that they all hate Vox, which takes a firmly Spanish nationalist stance, just like the late dictator. The PM is clearly hoping that the hard-right party will take the bait and publicly defend the dictatorship, which would hurt the PP (its likeliest ally after an election). Unfortunately for Sánchez, Vox’s leaders seem to have opted for a low profile recently.
On the other side of the coin, Spain is projected to have had the fastest-growing economy in the developed world in 2024; and unemployment has fallen below 11% for the first time in 16 years. While an economic boom is generally good for incumbents, the mood in the street doesn’t feel particularly bullish to me. It is telling that opinion polls suggest that the PP and Vox would be able to form a government after a snap election. The anti-incumbency mood seen throughout the West is alive in Spain.
In this context, it is surprisingly hard to predict what will happen next. Will Junts bring Sánchez down in the months ahead? Who knows! I think the base case probably involves lots of threats and posturing from Puigdemont, with Sánchez desperately looking for ways to swerve to avoid disaster. It is a dangerous and unpredictable game, though, so it is difficult to see how long both sides can keep it going.
Will there be a budget for 2025 before the end of March? I would guess probably not, although it is certainly not impossible if Sánchez swerves and gives Junts what the party wants. If there is no budget, will the Socialist-led government be able to survive after rolling over the 2024 one? It is certainly possible, at least for a few months, but is in no way a foregone conclusion.
If the government is able to survive, will it be able to pass any laws at all? We might see one or two, certainly, but it is hard to see many more given the tensions within the alliance. Can Sánchez get all the way through to August 2027? I think it looks extremely difficult without a budget deal and with a resentful partner trying to make the PM uncomfortable, although I could be wrong. If I am wrong, it will feel like a very long time indeed for political geeks in Spain.
Only one thing is clearer than ever: by tying his fortunes to a vehicle without a steering wheel, Sánchez has made Spanish political rhetoric more unpredictable than ever, while simultaneously making his government basically ineffective. Whatever happens, drama is a given.
Despite the noise, though, the government’s inability to pass laws is quite possibly one factor behind the healthy performance of the economy. Consider this a lesson in economic liberalism for any of the more interventionist members of Spain’s left and any nationalists who happen to be paying attention!
The comments are closed, as usual when I discuss populism. If you subscribe, though, you can hit reply to the email. I might not get to it immediately, but I will reply when I get a chance. See you next week!
Previously on Sharpen Your Axe
Capital flight (part one and part two)
Franco (part one, part two and part three)
Further Reading
Prisoner’s Dilemma: John Von Neumann, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb by William Poundstone
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