Two Interlocking Games of Politics

Winning elections and governing need different skill-sets, but can never be separated

"Interlocking Arches" by OriGann is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0

A libertarian economist called Bryan Caplan published an excellent book about politics called The Myth of the Rational Voter in 2007. While the whole book is worth reading, it is quite easy to summarize Caplan’s main argument. He says that the average voter has a number of biases about economics and this creates a dilemma for politicians: They can either appear creepy and untrustworthy but make people richer; or they can appeal to voters’ emotions while making people poorer. Many choose a middle path between both poles.

Caplan says: “To get ahead in politics, leaders need a blend of naive populism and realistic cynicism. No wonder the modal politician has a law degree… Economic issues are important to voters, but they do not want politicians with economic expertise - especially not ones who lecture them and point out their confusions. Instead, the electoral process selects people who are professionally trained to plead cases persuasively and sincerely, regardless of the merits.”

I believe that we can take Caplan’s excellent idea forward a little by bringing in two more recent books from Jan-Werner Müller and Arnold Kling; and by introducing the metaphor of the two major games of politics. One game involves winning elections; and the other involves governing succesfully. The games interlock and can never be entirely separated.

Before we discuss this new spin on Caplan’s idea in detail, let’s take a step backwards and look at the big picture. Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches to politics: The mainstream and populism. Mainstream politics developed in the 1930s after liberalism split apart. Liberalism is based on the skeptical idea that it is hard to know how other people should live their lives. Luckily, devolving decisions down to individuals tends to yield good results for society.

Liberalism falls across three dimensions. Liberal democracy is a system designed to protect the rights of individuals and minorities by curtailing the power of the government; and social liberalism involves letting people choose lifestyles that weren’t available to them in traditional societies; while economic liberalism is based on support for an individualistic and fast-growing market economy.

In mainstream politics, the progressive and social democratic left inherited liberal democracy and social liberalism but combined it with a regulated economy and a welfare state; while the conservative right inherited liberal democracy and economic liberalism but combined with traditional social values. Both typically alternate in power. The split between the left and the right is often a question of priorities. Is it better to grow the economy or to grow the welfare state? Liberal centrists often try to reunite social liberalism and economic liberalism, but tend not to do particularly well in elections.

In 2019, economist Kling published a book which argued that the best way of understanding mainstream politics is as a triangle, rather than a straight left-right spectrum. Each point of the triangle has its own language. Members of the progressive left often frame issues by looking at the oppression of one group by another; while the conservative right thinks in terms of traditional values, which can include support for free markets. In the middle, liberal centrists are concerned by individual freedom.

Unsurprisingly, devolving decisions down to individuals and families will never create a perfect society. Mainstream politicians, whether they are on the left, the right or the centre, are often characterized by unglamorous but pragmatic problems to knotty problems.

Competitive elections are one of the central planks of liberal democracy. Political philosopher Müller published a book in 2016 which argued that populism is “the permanent shadow” of representative politics. Some politicians feel that elections are meant to discover “the will of the people” rather than just being a convenient way of removing unpopular governments .These politicians, who we call populists, feel that they embody this voice. Populism can take left-wing or right-wing forms.

Populists find it hard to cope with electoral defeat, Müller says. They often invent conspiracy theories to explain away defeats and other inconvenient facts.

Müller says that the best way of understanding populists is to see them as anti-pluralists (we might say anti-liberals). Once they gain power, they often try to rewrite the rule book to make it harder for their opponents, who they see as the enemies of the people, to regain power. As well as rebelling against liberal democracy, populists often rebel against economic liberalism by imposing crony capitalism or a state-controlled economy; and against social liberalism by developing authoritarian answers to the question of how other people should live their lives.

If we return to the two games of politics, we can see that winning elections and governing require different skill-sets. In order to win an election, a politician needs to develop an emotionally compelling narrative to motivate voters. In order to govern, one of the main priorities is to attract investment to the economy, which will lead to growth, job creation and tax revenues. Simplistic narratives might attract voters in theory, while repelling investors in practice. Meanwhile, creating good conditions for private investment tends not to generate great slogans.

Mainstream politicians usually try to play the two games more or less simultaneously. The best way of doing this is to seek re-election as an incumbent by running on your track record of nurturing the economy. In other words, the priority is on governing, with winning elections as a secondary matter.

An important but often unspoken element of mainstream politics involves seeking to avoid worst-case scenarios, like economic depressions, famine or unnecessary wars. While this is undoubtedly good for society, it can be hard to sell in an election campaign.

More generally, an economics-first approach can be emotionally unsatisfying to ordinary voters. This leads mainstream politicians to use populism the same way cooks use salt: Too little is too bland and too much is indigestible, but a pinch gets the job done. In practice, mainstream politicians often get the dosage of populism wrong. When they use too much, they are in danger of leaving the mainstream and becoming populists. When they use too little, they appear creepy and disconnected from ordinary people, not to mention unable to give a straight answer.

Some members of society rebel against the political elite, seeing mainstream politicians as distant and aloof. These people often develop a conspiratorial mindset and can sometimes get drawn into the anti-globalist community, which is characterized by groupthink.

Full-blown populist politicians approach politics from a totally different angle than their rivals in the mainstream. Populists tend to offer voters simplistic narratives with a hedgehog-like sense of utter certainty. These narratives can be particularly appealing to voters during economic hard times or when elites have been caught with their hands in the till. Anti-globalists and other conspiracy theorists are particularly receptive to populist narratives.

Populist leaders are often unreflective and inattentive to detail. They tend to find governing much harder than mainstream politicians, as well as being much less concerned about avoiding worst-case scenarios. Research shows that populists handled the COVID-19 crisis much worse than their peers in the mainstream, for example. So, a narratives-first approach can be emotionally appealing to voters while leading to poor results.

Former US President Donald Trump perfectly exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses of populists. He won an unexpected electoral victory in 2016 by spreading black-and-white narratives with strong imagery as he talked about building a frontier wall and locking up his opponent. Once in power, he tried to combine traditional values with crony capitalism, while weakening liberal democracratic pluralism (anti-liberalism across three dimensions). However, he failed to adapt to COVID-19 and lost the 2020 election. He then couldn’t cope with his defeat and encouraged an unsuccessful coup attempt.

If populists punch above their weight in elections but fail to govern effectively, it is easy to see why referendums on divisive issues can be so dangerous. Populists can easily win once with narratives that are emotionally appealing to a segment of the population, as we saw in the UK with Brexit. On the other hand, regular elections are self-correcting. If a populist wins and then governs badly, he or she is likely to lose next time around - unless the populist government succeeds in rewriting the country’s constitution in its first term.

There are also various minor games of politics. Opposing the government of the day is an important minor skill, as is patching together a coalition government if your party doesn’t have a majority. Some politicians lose sight of the two most important games and major in the minors. Left-wing politicians often get much too comfortable staying in opposition instead of taking hard decisions in government; and some politicians, like Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, specialize in backroom deals instead of actually winning a majority in an election. This can be particularly dangerous if the policians seek deals with populists instead of other members of the mainstream, as Sánchez has done.

So, to summarize, winning elections and governing call for different skillsets. Mainstream politicians, who are characterized by varying degrees of liberalism and pragmatism, are better than populists at governing, but can struggle to gain traction in elections or referendums. Meanwhile, populists can sometimes win elections or referendums with anti-liberal narratives, but they tend not to be very good at governing. Hopefully, this week’s article will have given you some food for thought. See you next week for more!

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[Updated on 10 March 2022] Opinions expressed on Substack and Twitter are those of Rupert Cocke as an individual and do not reflect the opinions or views of the organization where he works or its subsidiaries.